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Without Causation, Fraud and Subsequent Loss Are
Not Adequate Grounds for Recovery
by Tom O'Connor

In Mark Law v. Medco Research
Inc., 113 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997),
Mark Law ("Plaintiffs") filed a class
action suit for similarly situated
investors in Medco Research Inc.
("Defendants"), claiming Defendants defrauded their investors. The
United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit dismissed the
securities fraud case, holding that
Plaintiffs had no case without proof
that securities losses were a result of
fraud and not market forces.

Statute of Limitation
Defenses Rejected
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants
made false or misleading announcements in violation of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Plaintiffs contended that Defendants
inappropriately encouraged investors to buy Defendants' stock when
Defendants announced that the Food
and Drug Administration was about
to approve its drug application.
Defendants responded that the
statute of limitations on Plaintiffs'
fraud claim had run before the suit
was filed. The statute of limitations
in securities fraud cases is one year
from the time a plaintiff receives
notice of fraud. Plaintiffs filed the
instant suit on September 1, 1993, so
they must have received notice of
the fraud before September 1, 1992,
to fall within the limitations period.
Defendants made three alternative arguments to show that their
investors had received notice of
fraud. First, Defendants argued that
a series of articles published before
1997

September 1, 1992 should have
provided "storm warnings" to
investors and satisfied the notice
requirement. These articles called
Defendants an "overpriced hype
job" whose stock was bought by
"idiots." In reviewing this argument, the court noted that these
articles were not given credence by
investors because the stock price of
Defendants' stock rose after each
article was published. Hence, the
court reasoned that the articles had
not provided stockholders with
notice, and the statute of limitations
did not begin to run when the
articles were published.
Second, in support of their statute
of limitations defense, Defendants
contended that stockholders had
notice of fraud earlier than they
claimed because during the early
1990's Defendants' stock was one of
the most "shorted" stocks on the
American Stock Exchange. Defendants argued that the "short selling"
indicated that stockholders were
concerned about the future of the
stock. In reviewing this argument,
the appellate court reasoned that for
every stock which had been sold
short, there was a buyer who felt the
stock would do well. All that the
"short selling" indicated, the court
explained, was a difference of
opinion between investors, not
notice of possible fraud.
Third, in support of their statute
of limitations defense, Defendants
submitted a series of articles
published in August of 1992, four
months after Defendants had
announced that their application for

a new drug was "on track." These
articles reported that: (1) Defendants' supplier of pharmaceuticals,
Fujisawa, was suing the company
which sold Fujisawa the production
facilities for Defendants' drug, and
(2) Fujisawa's production facility
had quality and regulatory problems
in producing a number of its drugs.
Defendants contended that these
articles should have given Plaintiffs
notice of fraud. In reviewing this
contention, the court concluded that
investors had no reason to have
notice of fraud because there was no
indication in these articles that
Defendants knew of the problems at
Fujisawa at the time of Defendants'
"on-track" announcement.
The court concluded that none of
Defendants' three alternative
arguments proved that the statute of
limitations had expired. Nonetheless, the court considered in dicta
whether the limitations period
expired for Plaintiffs' claims based
on an alternative argument called
equitable tolling.

Equitable Tolling Period
"Unnecessary"
The court considered whether the
limitations period would have run
by September 1, 1993, under an
equitable tolling theory if Plaintiffs
had received notice of fraud before
September 1, 1992. The court
considered the relationship between
the time of discovery of fraud in a
securities case and the doctrine of
equitable tolling. In an earlier case,
the United States Supreme Court
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held that equitable tolling was
unnecessary in a securities fraud
case because the limitations period
would not begin to run until a
plaintiff knew or should have known
that a fraud had been perpetrated.
In the present securities fraud
case, the Seventh Circuit found that
the limitations period does not begin
to run until a plaintiff knows both
that she has been misled and that
defendant intended to make a false
statement. Once both of these
requirements are met, the statute
begins to run. The court found this
interpretation to be consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding that the
equitable tolling period was unnecessary in securities fraud cases.
The court determined that an
objective test should be used to
determine when the limitations
period had begun to run in a fraud
case. Based on this analysis in the
present case, the statute would have

began to run when Plaintiffs should
have known of fraud, not when they
actually became aware of it. The
court concluded that since Defendants had not proved that the
investors became aware of the fraud
before Plaintiffs claimed they had,
Defendants had not proved their
affirmative defense that the limitations period had run.

Market, Not Fraud, Led to
Stock Losses
As an alternative defense,
Defendants produced a financial
expert's report which showed that
the drop in Defendants' stock price
'was consistent with the fluctuations
of the entire stock market. Plaintiffs
did not respond to this defense,
leaving the court without a basis to
question the report. Because the
report indicated that the loss would
have occurred even if Defendants

had not committed fraud, the court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the case. The court reasoned that
because competitors' stock prices
moved in a manner similar to
Defendants'stock, market forces
rather than fraud caused the decline
in Defendants' stock prices.
Therfore, the court held that
Plaintiffs had not met their burden
of proving fraud.
In conclusion, though the court
dismissed Defendant's statute of
limitations defense, it agreed with
Defendant's market forces defense.
The court held that absent proof that
the losses were not a result of
market forces, Plaintiff's fraud claim
could not be supported.

Limitations in Trademark Agreements Are Not Trade
Restrictions
by Linda A. Kerns
In Clorox Co. v. Sterling
Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d
Cir. 1997), the owner of the PINESOL trademark, the Clorox Company ("Clorox") alleged that
Sterling Winthrop, Inc. and Reckitt
& Colman, Inc. ("Reckitt"), the
former and current owners of the
LYSOL trademark violated the
Sherman Act. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court, holding that a trade310
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mark agreement which limited the
use of the PINE-SOL trademark
neither restrained trade nor created a
monopoly.
Clorox develops and sells
cleaning and disinfectant products
for household use and has a thirtyseven percent share of the allpurpose household cleaning market.
In 1990, Clorox purchased PINESOL, the oldest, best-selling pineoil-based cleaner on the market. The
PINE-SOL trademark has been used

since 1945 and was federally
registered in 1957.
Defendants also develop and sell
household cleaning products.
Sterling purchased the LYSOL mark
in 1966 and sold it to the codefendant in this litigation in 1994.
Reckitt currently has approximately
fifteen percent of the all-purpose
household cleaning market. The
LYSOL name has had federal
trademark protection as a disinfectant cleaner since 1906. LYSOL
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